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Evolving Strategy: Risk Management and the Shaping of Large Engineering Projects1 
 
Roger Miller and Donald Lessard 
  
Introduction and Overview 
Large engineering projects (LEPs) are high-stakes games characterized by substantial irreversible 
commitments, skewed reward structures when they are successful, and high probabilities of failure. Their 
dynamics also change over time. The journey from initial conception to ramp-up and revenue generation 
takes 10 years on average. While the “front end” of a project – project definition, concept selection, and 
planning – typically involves less than one third of the total elapsed time and expense, it has a 
disproportionate impact on outcomes, as most shaping actions occur during this phase. During the ramp-
up period, the reality of market estimates and the true worth of the project are revealed. Sponsors may find 
that actual conditions are very different from expectations, but only a few adaptations are possible. Once 
built, most projects have little flexibility in use beyond the original intended purpose. Managing risks is 
thus a real issue.  
The purpose of this chapter is to sketch out the various components of risk and outline ranges of 
strategies for coping with risks and turbulence based on an assessment of 60 projects as part of the IMEC 
study. Further more, we propose the elements of a governance system to master their evolutionary 
dynamics. The main finding is that successful projects are not selected but shaped. Rather than choosing a 
specific project concept from a number of alternatives at the outset based on projections of the full sets of 
benefits, costs and risks over the project’s lifetime, successful sponsors start with project ideas that have 
the potential to become viable. These sponsors then embark on shaping efforts to influence risk drivers 
                                                           
1 This chapter is based primarily on Miller and Lessard (2001) and the underlying IMEC study. However, it also 
reflects the insights that the two authors have gained from their separate journeys over the last six years. Miller has 
gone on to define and lead the MINE study, a large-scale project focusing on innovation games based at HEC. 
Lessard has continued his work on large-scale projects in the oil-and-gas sector as faculty director of the BP Projects 
Academy and the Major Projects Research Program at MIT.  
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ranging from project-related issues to broader governance. The seeds of success or failure of individual 
projects are thus planted early and nurtured over the course of the shaping period as choices are made. 
Successful sponsors, however, do not escalate commitments, and they abandon quickly when they 
recognize that projects have little possibility of becoming viable.  
  Two other key concepts related to risk that emerge from the study are governability – the creation 
of relationships that allow a project to be reconstituted and proceed even after major changes in project 
drivers and the resulting payoffs to the various parties involved – and turbulence – the tendency for risks 
to compound dramatically once things begin going off track.  
In our view, projects are dynamic, iterative, and often chaotic systems, and project-management 
architectures must reflect this. While they tend to resemble a spiral more than the classic waterfall, even 
this metaphor may be too orderly. Projects are better viewed as evolutionary and path-dependent systems 
composed of episodes displaying different dynamics. 
These findings apply equally, albeit in somewhat different ways, to the three distinct classes of 
risk (in terms of their causes) encountered in most projects: those emanating from the dynamics of the 
project itself (technical and operational risks), those associated with the markets with which the project 
interacts (market risks), and those related to the political, social, and economic setting of the project 
(institutional/social risks).  
In this chapter, we first discuss the IMEC project and the sample of projects that underlie it. We 
then describe the nature of risks encountered in projects and assess the various strategies that successful 
projects employ to cope with these risks. Using these descriptions, we highlight the extent to which 
project management in the face of risk is a sequence of shaping episodes, and then we draw conclusions. 
 
The IMEC Study and Large Engineering Projects 
 
The IMEC (International Program in the Management of Engineering and Construction) study grew out of 
the noted difficulties in project delivery that became public (Miller and Lessard 2001). As long as 
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governments and businesses were content to rely on traditional financing, governance, and methods, there 
was no need for innovative approaches. However, as public financing became tight and many projects 
become more financially, politically, and socially complex, methods that had served their purpose in the 
past were no longer sufficient.  
IMEC was thus set up to understand the changes that were occurring. To our knowledge, there had 
been no recent attempts to study, evaluate, and present a systematic analysis of the new approaches to 
large projects except the initiatives of the U.K. Treasury Board (HM Treasury 2006) , B. Flyvbjerg and his 
colleagues on mega projects and risks. (Flyvbjerg et al 2005) and the book by Thomas Hughes, Rescuing 
Prometheus (Hughes 1998).  To counter the objection that each project is unique and that generalizations 
are therefore impossible, we decided to undertake grounded research to understand what leads to success 
or failure, using a sample of 60 LEPs. The goal was to identify the practices that, in the experience of 
executives involved in projects, really made a difference. The IMEC study was distinctive in several ways. 
First, it was an international field study. The study sums up the collective experience from Europe, North 
and South America, and Asia. In general, seven to eight participants – sponsors, bankers, contractors, 
regulators, lawyers, analysts, and others – were interviewed for each of the 60 projects. Second, it 
involved systemic and strategic perspectives. Particular emphasis was placed on front-end development 
decisions, but execution and initial ramp-up to operation were also studied. Calling upon a range of 
disciplines, the IMEC study focused on themes such as coping with uncertainty through risk analysis, 
institution shaping, and strategies. Finally, projects were selected from a range of domains. The 60 
projects included 15 hydroelectric dams, 17 thermal and nuclear power plants, 6 urban transport facilities, 
10 civil infrastructure investments, 4 oil platforms, and 8 technology initiatives. 
Projects differ substantially in terms of the intensity of the social/institutional, technical, and 
market-related risks that they pose to sponsors (see figure 1 for the IMEC sample). For instance, oil 
platforms are technically difficult, but they typically face few institutional risks because they are built far 
from public attention and bring high direct benefits to their sponsors and affected parties. Hydroelectric-
power projects tend to be moderately difficult insofar as engineering is concerned, but very difficult in 
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terms of social acceptability. Nuclear-power projects pose high technical risks but still higher social and 
institutional risks. Road and tunnel systems present very high levels of risk, as rock formations usually 
hide big surprises and markets are difficult to predict when user fees are applied. Market risks faced by 
roads, bridges, and tunnels are especially high when private sponsors build them under concessionary 
schemes. Urban transport projects that meet real needs pose average market and social/institutional risks. 
However, they pose technical risks, as they often involve underground geological work that affects costs. 
Research-and-development projects present scientific challenges but face fewer social acceptability and 
market difficulties, as they can be broken into smaller testable investments. 
 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The Nature of Risks in Projects 
Risk is the possibility that events, their resulting impacts, and their dynamic interactions will turn out 
differently than anticipated. Risk is typically viewed as something that can be described in statistical 
terms, while uncertainty is viewed as something that applies to situations in which potential outcomes and 
causal forces are not fully understood. In this chapter, both risks and uncertainties will be referred as risks. 
Risks are multi-dimensional and thus need to be unbundled for a clear understanding of causes, outcomes, 
and drivers.  
In the IMEC study, managers were asked to identify and rank the risks they faced in the early 
front-end period of each project (Miller and Lessard, 2001). Market-related risks dominated in terms of 
mentions (41.7%), followed by technical risks (37.8%), and institutional and sovereign risks (20.5%). 
Figure 2 illustrates the frequency of mentions of the risks that managers identified as important in their 
projects. 
 
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
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Market-related Risks 
The ability to forecast demand varies widely, thus creating high levels of risk. The output of oil projects is 
a fungible commodity sold in highly integrated world markets: probabilistic forecasts are possible. In 
contrast, many road projects face a specific set of customers; however, users of highways, tunnels, 
bridges, airports, and ports often have alternatives, and forecasting behaviour is extremely difficult. 
Failures to reach traffic volume seriously threaten business models.  
 The market for financial inputs depends on prior risk management.2 Unless all risks have been 
addressed by sponsors, financial markets are hard to convince. Many projects that offer an adequate 
prospective return are unable to go forward because of the parties’ inability to work out acceptable risk-
sharing arrangements. Supply risks are similar to market risks: both involve price and access uncertainties. 
Supply may be secured through contracts, open purchases, or ownership. 
 
Completion Risks 
Projects face technical risks that reflect their engineering difficulties and degrees of innovation: some of 
these risks are inherent in the designs employed. Construction risks refer to the difficulties that sponsors, 
prime contractors, and contractors may face in the actual building of the project. Execution risks refer to 
issues that arise from errors or conflicts in the task breakdown, schedule, and so on.3 Operational risks 
refer to the possibility that the project will not function as expected – for example, that the availability, 
capacity, or operating efficiency will turn out to lower than anticipated. 
                                                           
2 The term “financial risk” is often used overly broadly to refer to risks with financial consequences – essentially 
everything. For us, the term applies only to events that have some underlying financial cause. 
3 Schedule risk also is often used to identify a risk that has an impact on schedule. Here, we refer to schedule risks 
only when they are a cause and not just a consequence. Of course, in episodes of turbulence (see below) a schedule 
impact may become a cause of further unraveling, and hence the distinction becomes less clear. 
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Institutional Risks 
The ability of projects to access key resources or to appropriate the returns from operations in order to 
repay debts and recoup and profit from investments depends on the laws, regulations, and norms that 
govern the appropriability of returns, property rights, and contracts. Some countries are governed under 
constitutional frameworks and the rule of law, while others are led by powerful political parties or clans. 
Institutional risks refer to unexpected changes in these rules and norms that somehow alter the project 
payoffs. They are typically seen as greatest in emerging economies – countries whose laws and 
regulations are incomplete and in a state of flux – although the risks associated with community 
opposition to projects (the NIMBY phenomenon) or changes in environmental regulations may be as great 
or greater in highly developed countries.  
Regulations concerning pricing, entry, unbundling, and other elements are presently undergoing 
major changes in many countries, thus opening opportunities. Social-acceptability risks refer to the 
likelihood that sponsors will meet opposition from local groups, economic-development agencies, and 
influential pressure groups. Sovereign risks, in turn, involve the likelihood that a government will decide 
to renegotiate contracts, concessions, or property rights. 
 Many of these risks emerge only over time. Emerging opportunities or risks may call for changes 
in project configurations.  Benefits may outweigh costs but the reverse can also be true. Projects that 
appeared sound at one point in time all of a sudden become ungovernable. Events burst out and interact to 
create turbulence. Figure 3 illustrates the evolution of risks that emerge and challenge sponsors. Many 
risks are linked to the life cycle of the project: regulatory risks, for instance, diminish very soon after 
permits are obtained, while technical risks drop as engineering experiments are performed.  
 
 
 7 
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Turbulence 
While strictly speaking not an additional category of risk, one aspect of risk that we observed in many 
projects was turbulence. Turbulence refers to the way that consequences of events are compounded in 
unforeseen ways, even if the initial event lies within a range of possibilities that was known in advance, 
but often more seriously in the case of events that are truly “surprises.” In the face of such difficulties, 
some parties have a tendency to leave projects or minimize their losses, perhaps at the expense of other 
participants. Moves and countermoves lead to a vortex that causes project demise. Without a set of 
institutional and governance devices to contain degradation, otherwise viable projects sink into deadlocks. 
In the case of a major civil transportation project, the discovery of geological conditions that were 
different from those planned for but well within the range of possibilities and did not represent that large a 
change in overall project economics, for example, allowed opponents to raise multiple issues that 
ultimately caused the collapse of the entire project.  
 
Opportunity Failures and Oversights 
Opportunity failures refer to the risk of missing a good opportunity to improve value or to reduce costs 
due to error, inadvertence, or even design. While an opportunity failure may be seen as a risk event 
resulting from a completion or social/institutional cause, the accumulation of such oversights in a project 
may itself become a cause of a governance crisis. Failures to capture opportunities do not threaten a 
project’s continuity when the public or private sponsors remain unaware of what could have been 
achieved. When, however, there is a consensus that too many opportunities have been lost, the sponsor or 
other key players may lose legitimacy in the eyes of others, and the fabric of agreements required to 
sustain the project breaks down. 
Oversight risks are particularly salient when projects are constructed using the traditional mode of 
contracting, in which the sponsors define expectations in detail and call for bids for execution: since these 
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arrangements typically have no mechanisms for responding to opportunities and changes in circumstances, 
they thus generate oversights. In contrast, new modes of governance that rely on partnerships or relational 
contracts may allow the incorporation of changes and trigger innovative solutions that reduce the 
likelihood of such oversights. 
 
Approaches to Managing Risk in Large Engineering Projects 
Theoretical perspectives on structuring and coping with risks range from narrow, technical analysis to 
systemic political and institutional approaches. In the course of the IMEC study, we have observed that 
sponsors strategize to influence outcomes by using six main risk-management techniques: decisioneering 
to assess and mitigate risks; building robust strategic systems; instilling governability; shaping 
institutions; hedging and diversifying risks through portfolios; and embracing risks.  
Figure 4 illustrates the applicability of these strategies to types of risks classified along two axes: 
the extent to which the risks are controllable and the degree to which they are specific to the project or 
inherent to the economic system and thus affecting large numbers of actors. When risks are specific to the 
project and controllable – that is, endogenous – the usual prescription is to mitigate with risk-management 
approaches. However, if one party has comparative advantage in such mitigation, due to possessing more 
information regarding the risk or control over the outcomes, the prescription is to shift these risks to that 
party through contract. When risks are poorly defined but at least partially under the control of affected 
parties, governments, or regulators, transforming them through institutional influence is the way for 
sponsors to gain some control. When risks apply broadly but are not under the control of any of the 
parties, the preferred approach is to transfer them through hedging transactions when markets exist or 
though insurance when it is priced efficiently. Sponsors must be prepared to embrace the remaining risk, 
and typically enhance their ability to do so by diversifying exposure through forming portfolios of 
projects, or equivalently, syndicating out parts of some projects to balance their overall exposure.  
 
[FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
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Classic Decisioneering Approaches to Assessing and Controlling Risks  
Decisioneering approaches view projects as initiatives that can be planned in advance and under 
conditions of calculable risks. Careful analyses of trade-offs between costs and risks, it is argued, can 
yield good approximations for the appropriate timing of investment in projects. Accelerating a project will 
increase development costs to the point that there is a danger of sinking it. Proceeding with prudence 
increases the danger of missing the opportunity that the project aims to capture. 
This perspective, typical of much of the project-management literature (Cleland and Ireland 2006) 
assumes an environment in which the range of issues facing a project is more or less constant and current 
quantitative trends can be easily extrapolated into the future. Decisioneering approaches can be grouped 
into two basic streams. The first are quantitative sensitivity analyses that investigate the impact that 
possible deviations in some variables, such as anticipated costs, may have on financial performance. The 
second are  probabilistic approaches -- using scenario analysis, decision trees, or influence diagrams --, 
that provide more sophisticated alternatives to sensitivity analysis and, in some cases, link the assessment 
of risk to choices and actions. Sensitivity analysis and similar approaches are helpful for making go–no-go 
decisions by eliminating the projects with high anticipated performance variability. However, because 
they focus on aggregate variables, they are less useful for the concrete and detailed shaping of a strategic 
system through specific choices and actions. 
 
Building Robust Strategic Systems 
Sponsors of projects deal with anticipated risks, constraints, and issues by creating strategic systems with 
scope. Large-scale projects potentially face several classes of risks: sponsorship/development, market, 
social acceptability, regulatory and political, financial, execution, and operation. A large portion of the 
risks are addressed with project-specific strategies, to reduce the odds of negative events or the maximal 
negative impact that such events may have on the project. We identified five classes of strategies 
(summarized in table 1): information/selection, co-optation, allocation, design, and action.  
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[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Information/selection strategies refer to the approaches that managers use to gather information 
about the project and its environment, as well as to shape and approve the project concept, and to identify 
and decide on the best strategies. We identified three classes of information/selection strategies: studies, 
private search, and relational probing. “Studies” refer to “impersonal” and “objective” information-
gathering approaches such as comparative costs estimates, forecasts, tests, and simulations. In this class, 
selection emphasizes theoretical models and bureaucratic procedures. The “private search” class involves 
the use of a network of personal contacts to obtain “privileged” information; it often requires a history of 
previous joint work and trust. Selection takes the form of early commitment to and relentless but flexible 
pursuit of a single opportunity. “Relational probing” refers to lengthy face-to-face interactions with 
potential participants, such as banks, regulators, clients, suppliers, engineering and construction firms, 
operators, and affected parties, during which the information emerges and concept is directly tested. Like 
personal searches, relational probing strategies proactively uncover flaws or risks and focus on meeting 
potential opponents and critics of the project, rather than friends. Selection relies on iterative discussion 
and negotiation to expose unworkable alternatives and stimulate the emergence of a better project concept. 
The information/selection approach used will influence the extent to which risks are identified and the 
quality of the solutions and strategies that will be produced. 
Co-optation strategies secure a basic set of “core competencies,” such as technical and 
construction skills, which will increase the odds for success in critical areas of project execution and 
ensure access to “resources” such as markets, financing, and even public support. The first step in co-
optation is deciding which resources can be provided by the owner’s business units or subsidiaries. Some 
projects, however, require bringing independent participants on board through “partnership” links – as co-
owners, joint-venture partners, or equity investors. Alternatively, resources can be co-opted through 
contracts and formal agreements such as project financing and tax treaties. Then again, access to some 
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resources may be achieved through informal “engagement” links with communities and other stakeholders 
in order to obtain their support.  
Allocation strategies refer to the detailed ways in which rights, responsibilities, rewards, and risks 
are apportioned between participants through pricing, transfer, penalty, incentive, and other contractual 
clauses. Parties to a contract delimit their respective responsibility areas – what each of them has to 
provide to the other party, when, and under what conditions. For instance, a joint venture between an 
electric utility and an independent firm contains agreements that stipulate that the utility provides a site for 
the gasification plant and guarantees the supply and quality of coal, demineralised water, and auxiliary 
power. The utility has the obligation to accept all the synthetic gas that meets the quality requirements and 
owns all the by-products that result from the gasification process. Failure to supply the required quantities 
reliably triggers the payment of penalties.  
Price-determination formulas are another frequently used allocation strategy. Cost-reimbursement 
contracts allocate risks to the owner; fixed-price contracts transfer the cost-overrun risk to the contractor. 
In cost-incentive and performance-based price-determination schemes, the owners and contractors share 
the risks and rewards. In many power plant projects the price of the turnkey contract increases if the 
contractors delivered the plant early or if performance tests revealed that real plant capacity was larger 
than specified capacity. Other risk-allocation strategies limit the negative consequences for one of the 
parties to a contract. For instance, utilities often include clauses that allow them to cancel contracts with 
independent developers if regulators do not allow them to fully recover the contract costs from their 
customers. Economic-dispatch formulas can be designed to pass the additional costs resulting from 
operating a power plant at sub-optimal capacity on to the electric utility that purchases the power and 
dispatches the plant. 
Design strategies involve the use of technical, organizational, scheduling, and financial choices to 
reduce the likelihood and impact of risks. One spectacular example of a technical solution used mainly for 
political risks is the building of power plants on barges that can be towed away from the host country in 
case of difficulties. Other examples are technical solutions that reduce the supply risk by providing fuel 
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flexibility, repowering old plants to avoid regulatory risk, and economic development initiatives to gain 
the support of local communities.  
Action strategies include confronting opponents using legal or informational means; persuading 
other participants and stakeholders such as banks, rating agencies, regulators, politicians, publics, and 
opponents; making gestures that legitimate the project in the eyes of the regulators or the communities; 
developing alternatives to be used if the preferred course of action is blocked by an adverse event; and 
taking pre-emptive steps to signal commitments. For instance, faced with the prospect of social 
opposition, the owners of the ITA power plant project in Brazil established a public relations centre in the 
community and organized town-hall meetings at which the project was explained. Opposition weakened 
and the population became an ally of the project. Traditionally, engineering firms design projects under a 
cost-reimbursement contract, and construction is contracted using fixed-price or unit-price contracts. More 
recently, engineering-procurement-construction and turnkey contracts group these activities together to 
better align incentives between engineering and construction. BOT-like schemes, which make a single 
firm or consortium responsible not only for developing, designing, and building the project but also for 
operating it for a long period of time, propose an even more radical way of aligning incentives. Finally, 
participant selection procedures may range from invited negotiations to open and public calls for bids. 
 
Instilling Governability  
In the last 20 years, the environments in which LEPs, such as power plants, highways, bridges, tunnels, 
and airports, are developed have become increasingly characterized by turbulence resulting from shifts in 
institutional frameworks, political and economic discontinuities, a rise in environmental and social 
activism, and, to a lesser extent, technological changes and innovations. Such changes clearly limit the 
validity of traditional risk-management approaches. 
  Diligent sponsors do not sit idle, waiting for the probabilities to yield a “win” or a “loss,” but 
work hard to influence outcomes and turn the selected initial option into a success. They shepherd their 
choices in light of changing conditions and often succeed against odds. Governability is enabled by 
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instilling a series of properties in projects: cohesion, reserves, flexibility, and generativity (Miller and 
Floricel 2005). These four properties are often contradictory, so a balance must be sought. For instance, 
strong inter-organizational bonds increase cohesion but limit flexibility. Hierarchical links create 
inefficiencies, while long-term contracts bring rigidities. Short-term contracts do not provide sufficient 
stabilization of the future to induce adequate investment. Increasing flexibility through design and 
incentives may reduce the efficiency of the project.  
Cohesion is the property that results in participants’ staying with the project and solving the 
problems caused by turbulence, instead of exiting as crises erupt. The main sources of cohesion are the 
bonds between project participants resulting from co-optation strategies and informal links created during 
project execution or early operation. Still other bonds are the result of collateral ties between the 
organizations participating in a project.  
Inadequate cohesion leads to disintegration. Cohesion emerged quite unexpectedly as the basic 
governability property; one cannot govern a project that is disintegrating; flexibility is clearly not enough. 
To support reserves can be built into the institutional arrangements surrounding a project. In fact, 
ownership is the dominant factor in building reserves. Co-optation and sharing, used to deal with 
anticipated risks, also build in the ability to respond to turbulence. Reserves are frequently incorporated 
into execution budgets and schedules; contingency allowances in budgeted costs are a common practice 
for dealing with cost and schedule variability. Finally, reserves can be designed into projects through 
redundancies and slack resources.  
Flexibility is the property that enables a project to be restructured as choices, actions, and 
commitments, which initially stabilized the future, change when unexpected events occur. Flexibility can 
be achieved by using strategies that do not produce long-term constraints, offer other avenues for action, 
or reduce the costs of restructuring and pursuing alternatives. These costs can be reduced through co-
optation and design strategies that emphasize modularity, in which no element of the project is critical by 
itself. Contractual structures associated with co-optation and allocation strategies are among of the main 
sources of lack of flexibility. The same long-term contracts that reduce market and fuel-supply risks in 
 14 
independent projects may block efforts to respond to new market realities. Contracts often create rigidity 
at the interface between owner and contractor; as contractors stick to specifications, changes required by 
the owner will be very expensive. 
Generativity is the ability to develop creative responses to situations that appear difficult. 
Response generation presupposes correct sensing and interpretation, as well as the time and attention 
needed to produce constructive rather than destructive debates. Co-optation strategies, especially those 
that bring in participants with different competencies, may help. Having many points of view and access 
to different networks also means that adverse developments will probably be detected earlier and different 
perspectives will be brought into the discussion. For instance, unlike projects financed on the balance 
sheet, project financing brings banks, investment advisors, rating agencies, and consulting engineers to the 
heart of project debates. Creative individuals bring in new perspectives from outside the circle of 
managers who normally participate in the project. With their different experiences, they can sense danger 
and propose innovative solutions. On the other hand, numerous participants and contractual interfaces 
hamper creativity, especially when parties focus on contracts instead of problem solving. 
 
Shaping Institutional Forces 
The prevailing framework of laws and regulations serves to reduce uncertainty and opportunism. Coherent 
and well-developed institutional arrangements are, without a doubt, the most important determinants of 
project performance.  Projects shaped in incomplete and shifting arrangements have a hard time taking 
off:   they require deals that may not stand for long. In contrast, well-developed laws, regulations, and 
practices contribute significantly to enhancing project performance.  
However, complex projects present challenges and sometimes call for transformation of laws and 
regulations. The main function of institutional arrangements is to help anchor projects in their economic 
and political contexts and ensure that investments will be repaid and social utility be provided. Unless they 
are solidly anchored, projects will be at the mercy of shifting interests, caprices, and opportunistic moves. 
Sponsors will seek institutional arrangements to buttress LEPs. 
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Stabilization of the long-term future to enable investments. Legal and regulatory frameworks, such 
as sector regulations and concession frameworks, help to reduce risks by minimizing opportunities for 
clients, communities, or governments to attempt to capture revenues after the investment is sunk. The goal 
is to create the prospect of secure streams of funds in the long term to cope with the various uncertainties 
that can affect the project. To secure streams of revenues, the approach throughout most of the twentieth 
century has been to assign sponsorship and ownership to network operators. Recently, power-purchase 
agreements in which the regulator or the state forces network operators to sign long-term supply contracts 
with independent producers, have been used as a tool for providing revenue flows. Concessions by the 
state to sponsors also provide a framework for future revenues but are less secure.  
Flexibility to face turbulence. During the front-end development of projects, when agreements are 
negotiated and commitments made, managers develop specific strategies to cope with foreseeable risks; 
they cannot, however, develop specific ways to cope with “surprise” events. Turbulence is likely to arise 
given the long time span required for development. Flexibility is provided by elements of institutional 
arrangements that enable projects to undergo rescheduling, restructuring, or bankruptcy. The flexibility 
provided by institutional arrangements helps many projects survive unforeseen events.  
Enhancing the legitimacy of projects, participating organizations, and agreements. Many projects 
face opposition from interest groups. Laws, regulations, and practices that create well-structured 
assessment frameworks enable sponsors and interest groups to air their views through public hearings, and 
even to oppose decisions through appeal procedures. Public-bidding frameworks structure the orderly 
selection of “fit” sponsors and provide legitimacy. Practices such as inviting representatives of the public 
into planning and design meetings and proactively consulting conservationist groups and environmental 
regulators help to find credible solutions and reduce the likelihood of protest.  
Frameworks for structuring voice, decision making, and public trade-offs make it possible to 
choose public transportation systems, erect power plants, and, in some countries, build nuclear facilities. 
To manage social-acceptability risks in siting of power plants in Japan, for instance, the Three Power 
Source Laws System was put in place by the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry. This 
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framework structures public consultations and hearings across the country; the population is consulted on 
choice of eventual sites for projects and their technical features.  
Sponsors attempting to anchor projects often find that laws and regulations are incomplete. Many 
projects serve to unlock new models of project delivery (for example, the first BOTs [build-operate-
transfer projects] were developed in the 1980s). One third of the projects analysed by IMEC required at 
least one change in laws and rules. Concession rights, property rights, economic regulations, or foreign-
investment rules needed to be modified. More than one-fourth required or accompanied changes in 
property rights: land rights, water rights, monopoly on or improvements to BOT and concession 
frameworks. Changes to laws and regulations in capital markets were also frequent. A few projects called 
for new environmental frameworks. 
 
Portfolios, Insurance, and Hedging 
The principle of diversification is applied in projects in many different ways. In the IMEC studies, three 
applications were observed. First, sponsors of risky projects likely to face turbulence from disturbances 
caused by economic crises or government behaviours build a diversified portfolio across sectors and 
jurisdictions to balance risks and cash flows. Positive variations in a few compensate for negative 
outcomes in others. While sponsors may be able to influence some behaviours, these risks – particularly 
those of overall macroeconomic conditions or general policy changes – by and large are beyond the 
control of project participants. Diversification generally is the sole option. Second, sponsors may hedge 
against possible losses due to currency fluctuations or commodity exposures by employing financial 
derivatives or other structures to shift these exposures to “the market at large,” which by definition 
possesses the maximum diversification potential and hence should demand the lowest premium for 
bearing such risks. Third, sponsors may protect themselves against political risks by investing in many 
countries, finding partners in each country, or buying insurance against expropriation. They may also 
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engage in shaping or influencing behaviours by incorporating legitimate stakeholders and/or by being sure 
that they deliver value to those in control.4 
 
Embracing Residual Risks  
Of course, not all risks can be mitigated, shaped to sponsors’ advantage, or transferred to others through 
contracts or markets transactions. Successful project sponsors and other strategic players understand 
which risks must be taken in order to seek “the prize” associated with the project. Through experience, 
they have developed a clear sense of their comparative advantage in bearing various risks, reflecting their 
financial strength (their capital base, diversification, access to capital markets, and financial 
sophistication), their understanding of particular risk domains, and their influence over the relevant events 
or consequences of those events. Figure 5 illustrates the comparative advantage of different actors 
associated with major public-private projects in dealing with various types of risk. 
 
[FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Matching responses to risks 
Efficient risk management requires matching risks and responses, all within a dynamic iterative system. 
This is typically done though an iterative “layering process,” as depicted in figure 6. For any given risk 
that is identified, there is a pecking order of responses – for example, mitigating or shaping for risks that 
are controllable to some extent – applying the principle of comparative advantage to determine who best 
should bear them given the ability to control coupled with the financial capacity to bear the risk: hedging 
in the case of risk that can easily be transacted in financial markets, and pooling or diversification for risks 
that cannot be shaped or traded. 
 
                                                           
4 For an excellent recent study of how sponsors deal with political risk in major projects, see Wells and Ahmed 
(2007). 
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[ F I G U R E  6  A B O U T  H E R E  
 
 
In the IMEC study, we observed that when the strategies used by sponsors in the shaping of their 
projects and facing risks are broad, projects perform well. In fact, the scope of the strategic system is 
statistically and significantly linked to the performance of projects: the chi-square correlation coefficient 
between the scope of the strategic system and project performance is 8.3 with a confidence level 0f 0.015. 
Governing Projects as Evolutionary Systems 
The strategic system set by the sponsors to shape concepts and cope with risks is built up through time.  In 
this section, we will outline a governance framework to manage projects while recognizing that they are 
essentially evolutionary and messy. The actual decision-making processes observed in the projects studied 
in IMEC were indeed messy, and often chaotic. Projects are often launched by promoters who need to 
charm potential participants and feel compelled to build convincing but less-than-reality-grounded stories. 
Expenditures are allocated to soft issues such as opinion research, public affairs, and announcements that 
lay bare issues of politics and power. Decisions are never final but are remade, recast, and reshaped. 
Confrontations often bring deadlocks. 
This messiness, as opposed to clear-cut decision-making, has led many observers to argue that 
LEPs are basically unmanageable, and that success is a matter of luck and improvisation. In reality, 
projects are better viewed as evolutionary systems where messy decision processes can be structured by a 
governance framework that combines discipline with creative responses.  
 
The Performance of Projects 
Traditional perspectives on project management measure performance in terms of meeting projected costs, 
deadlines, and functionality. However, project sponsors buy benefits not artefacts: they evaluate projects 
by the value and satisfaction they create.  Should one adopt an evolutionary perspective, performance 
becomes the output of processes over which control varies from strong to minimal. Achieved results may 
be different from initial expectations for a number of reasons: 
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- The internal governance framework of the sponsoring organization may have led to initial 
estimates that were the off mark, wrong, or deceptive, as managers were unwilling to allocate the 
resources necessary to build solid estimates or tell the truth. 
- Capabilities of sponsors or consultants to shape projects or respond to crises may have been 
inadequate or have faltered. Exogenous or endogenous events may have required competencies that 
parties did not have. 
- Exogenous unexpected events beyond the control of sponsors or partners may have generated 
turbulence that was difficult to master. 
- Sponsors may have changed priorities mid-course, set new goals, or cut budgets, thus triggering 
endogenous turbulence. 
- Bold moves to profit from emerging technical or market opportunities may have led to overruns 
but with increased benefits. Overall satisfaction may be high together with a perception of bad 
management.  
Should one adopt an evolutionary perspective, the performance of projects becomes not a 
comparison with goals stated many years ago but the output of processes of shaping, countermoves and 
facing emerging risk.  The project that has been built differs from the original concept because of 
unexpected events, imposed redesigns or voluntary changes in the concept. 
 
Progressive Issue Resolution through Shaping Episodes 
Rather than evaluating projects at the outset based on projections of the full sets of benefits and costs over 
their lifetime, competent sponsors view and shape them in evolutionary perspectives. They start with 
initial concepts that have the possibility of becoming viable. They then embark on shaping efforts to 
refine, reconfigure, and eventually agree on acceptable concepts. Sponsors cut their losses quickly when a 
concept has little possibility of becoming viable. 
Shaping episodes start with broad hypotheses about what nested problems and risks need to be 
addressed and what resources are necessary to achieve progress. The shaping process combines deliberate 
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actions with responses to emergent situations. A variety of intertwined issues have to be resolved one by 
one by sponsors alone or in cooperation with partners or co-specialized firms. Progress typically involves 
“buying in” some stakeholders and “buying off” others. In some cases, the expectations of stakeholders 
can be specified in advance. In many cases, though, it is not clear how to accommodate various interests; 
the leading sponsor uses the front-end period to identify mutual-gains trajectories. 
Episodes start with momentum building, continue with the countering of opposing forces, and 
iterate until closure can be achieved. As shaping progresses, new options are opened and old ones are 
closed. At closure, clients and partners agree to commit thus losing degrees of freedom.  
 Momentum building. Momentum is built by imagining concepts, promoting legitimacy, and 
selling a project configuration such that partners, affected parties, and governments accept what is 
proposed. Risk seminars and decision conferences are used to shape the value proposition and identify 
risks. To ensure that investments are protected against opportunistic behaviours, risk-sharing agreements 
will be developed. To gain legitimacy, consent from affected parties and approval by governments will be 
sought.  
Meeting countering forces. The countering forces that come into play over time can easily 
sidetrack weak sponsors into wrong choices or lead inexperienced ones to kill good ideas. In each shaping 
episode, the forces of criticisms and counteractions will be at work. Opponents will call for realism. 
Experts will challenge cost estimates and risk potentials. Sponsors will respond and take actions that may 
plant the seeds of later failure or success. In situations of antagonism or when desire to collaborate is 
mixed with the intention to oppose, parties learn opponents’ values, communicate promises, and make 
veiled or overt threats to arrive eventually at meetings of minds. 
Sponsors sometimes believe their own overly optimistic assumptions. Weak analyses, incomplete 
research, and the need to show progress lead to the rejection of valid criticisms. Excessive realism, in 
contrast, leads to scepticism and to the eventual rejection of good opportunities. What is basically a good 
concept is painted negatively and rejected. Unfavourable judgments drive away parties whose contribution 
is critical. Doubts, negative stories, and emergent problems set in motion self-fulfilling prophecies. 
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Sponsors often yield to the temptations of unreasonable commitments because they are unaware of 
particular risks. Blindness generally comes from the inability to form coalitions that confront distinct but 
relevant viewpoints. Regulatory agencies may refuse to grant permits or change rules during project 
shaping. Only projects whose leaders and sponsors have the resources, willingness, and competencies to 
counteract destructive forces survive. 
Closure. Eventually, imperfectly coordinated but stabilized understandings move toward temporary 
agreements that are enforceable. Each shaping episode ends with a process of closure that suggests either 
abandoning the whole project or accepting a temporary agreement on a concept configuration. 
 Closure takes many forms; memorandum of understanding, business case, negotiated agreement, 
formal public commitment, sets of formal contracts, and so on. The dangers associated with closure are 
that choices can be made too early or too late, too rigidly or too flexibly. Missing the boat – rejecting a 
good opportunity – is just as real a possibility as selecting a bad option or pursuing the wrong project. 
Premature closure locks a project on a rigid configuration, narrow sets of agreements, or irreversible 
choices that limit degrees of freedom for the future.  
When exogenous or endogenous forces are strong, the agreed upon closure may be reopened at the 
start of another shaping episode. For example, emerging technical opportunities may call for reopening IT 
projects or infrastructure projects. When this occurs, assessing costs against benefits is necessary. 
Similarly, changes in the business models may call for reconfiguration of the agreement. Figure 7 pictures 
the shaping effort as going up a hill through coalition building, problem solving, and risk management in 
the face of counter-dynamics such as cynicism, false expectations, and feedback effects.  
 
[FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE]  
 
Projects as Paths of interdependent Shaping Episodes 
Projects are rarely shaped in one over-arching episode. Instead, multiple and interdependent episodes are 
necessary to resolve issues and arrive at a closure that, though reopenable, can be agreed upon. Episodes 
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are not stages that logically flow from one to the other but distinct shaping dynamics that are autonomous 
yet path dependent. Figure 8 illustrates the path of early front-end shaping episodes for a bridge project 
that was examined in great detail. Five episodes characterized the progression from initial hypothesis to 
formal contracts and construction fund release. We will present these episodes in a generic manner:  
 
[FIGURE 8 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Initiation and exploration. The initiation episode is usually short (six months to a year) and closes 
when a credible party conveys to others that the project concept has relevance and should be sponsored. 
The credible party states openly that it is ready to allocate funds and lead debates on the ways and means 
of shaping and financing the idea. In the IMEC sample, project ideas were initiated by network operators 
(32%), entrepreneurial firms (20%), political leaders (20%), technical entrepreneurs (12%), and owners of 
rights (8%). 
 Resources of a few million dollars are used to shape the project concept during this episode. 
Exploratory searches are conducted internally or in collaboration with external parties. In the IMEC 
sample, the dominant modes of exploration were a team in symbiosis with external consultants (16%); 
open idea competition (20%), strategic-planning groups (30%), and entrepreneur design (28%). 
Conceptual closure is achieved when independent studies confirm the viability of the concept. The output 
is a series of documents sketching out ideas but with an emphasis on technical issues. The most common 
form is a position paper presented to legitimate authorities, such as ministers or boards of directors.  
Development of holistic proposals. The leading sponsors start with “horseback” assumptions and 
proceed to develop holistic proposals covering financial and technical parameters, social acceptability, 
environmental challenges, and regulatory decisions and permits. The central concern is to maintain a 
perspective that avoids blindness to risks. Sponsors build fully developed scripts addressing pertinent risks 
and providing concrete solutions. Holistic proposals are presented as a business cases to investors or 
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public authorities. Preparing such proposals is expensive: from a few to many tens of millions of dollars. 
Entrepreneurial sponsors are often unable to fund such efforts. 
Extended negotiations. Assuming that a version of the holistic proposal has been selected, the 
leader works with selected bidders to clear out assumptions concerning risks, revenues, costs, guarantees, 
engineering design, and other factors. Assumptions often need to be reworked. Many sketched 
relationships have to be made operational. Numerous issues skipped earlier are discovered and require 
solutions. Such issues may include definition of property rights to protect sponsors; development of 
guarantees to protect clients from completion risks faced by sponsors; negotiation of terms of guarantees 
and covenants to protect banks and investors; determination of the public contribution in the case of 
projects in which toll revenues are insufficient; determination of pricing structures and conditions of the 
concession; and identification of rules, regulations, and laws that will have to be modified to provide 
security to the project. 
 When a government is the sponsor, negotiations of agreements have to meet additional criteria of 
transparency, probity, and accountability. Negotiations often extend over many years because different 
departments have distinct requirements and expectations. Many winners of competitions, having sketched 
beautiful holistic proposals, are dismayed when they have to restart negotiations after winning a bid and 
spend $15–20 million just to work out issues that they thought were resolved. 
 Confronting emerging fears. As information is made public, pressure groups are triggered. Facing 
social and environmental fears is a very expensive affair. Sponsors have to bind themselves through 
actions to gain consent. Promises to engage in future actions are insufficient. Concrete moves to meet 
expectations and solve social and environmental issues have to be made. 
 If parties are unable to forge agreements, they must wait for court or government decisions. The 
presence of public social- and environmental-assessment frameworks is extremely important here in 
helping to solve dilemmas. Delays are the inevitable consequence of such formal assessments, but the 
public framework builds legitimacy and forces parties either to make trade-offs or to kill the project. 
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 Closure on a committable package. Commitment on a final package can take place when all major 
issues have been resolved. In many projects, sponsors have spent a few hundred million dollars to shape a 
holistic proposal, gain consent, solve social and environmental issues and build agreements. Once the slow 
front-end shaping process closes on a committable package, the sprint to engineering, procurement, and 
construction may then begins. 
 The costs of shaping projects and planning to meet risks can be high. For simple projects, around 
2-3 % of the overall costs will be spent in planning activities. However, for socially complex projects up 
to 35% of the total costs will be spent in shaping the concept, ensuring good quality coordination between 
players and investing to master risks. Leadership tends to be different in each episode. During the 
initiation period, entrepreneurs or political officials tend to be leaders until a credible client accepts the 
project as a viable idea. In developing proposals and negotiations, two leaders, the owner and the 
sponsor/developer, interact. During construction, leadership is shared between the owner and contractors. 
 Sometimes, the re-opening of closure is so powerful that shaping has to return to early 
conceptualization. For example, during the construction of the Tucurui dam in Brazil, the extent of rain 
was such that prior estimates about the flow of water had to be revised and all designs redone while 
constructing. Similarly, progress in clinical research may lead doctors to openly question assumptions 
embedded in the design of a university hospitals.  
 
Governance Frameworks for Shaping Projects as Evolutionary Systems 
Various governance arrangements for developing projects have been tried. The rational model for 
project planning emerged in the twentieth century to replace the entrepreneurial approach. Belief in formal 
analysis was, and still is, the central pillar of the rational approach. Successful projects are portrayed as 
the product of advanced planning by experts who carefully weigh forecasts, alternatives, and contracts. 
Project failures are seen largely as resulting from planning errors. Although many studies showed that 
large projects did not always conform to the rational-system model, the ideal lives on.  
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The approach proposed here combines rational planning with evolutionary shaping as progress is 
made on facing issues, risks, and opportunities. Governance frameworks can be built at the projects level 
but also at the institutiobal level to provide the scaffolding around which the various issues of projects can 
be shaped. 
Governance means setting up a structure - a set of decision-making processes and methods for 
accumulating of knowledge to ensure that creativity and discipline are brought to bear. In conjunction 
with analytical planning, debates, and discussions about risks, value creation, and opportunities to reopen 
projects are kept alive. They make sure that risks are not defined as cost contingencies but that risk-
management systems are put in place to trigger the negative feedback loops necessary to counteract the 
positive loops. The reopening of closed agreements will be subjected to cost-benefits tests.  
The participant. Building a structure to shape projects through their multiple episodes requires 
deciding what parties will be involved. The structure must identify the multiple perspectives from which 
the project may be viewed, and the multiple tests that it should be subjected to. If the project team is 
staffed only with internal technical experts, projects will be configured in technical terms. In contrast, if 
the project office includes external parties experienced contractors, lawyers representing opponents, and 
professional managers with a systemic perspective, risks and opportunities will be addressed. Sponsors 
that become blind to particular risks do so because they have not brought distributed and differentiated 
expertise and viewpoints. They fail to form coalitions that can identify the major issues, put in place 
mechanisms to address them, and not allow commitments to get out of step with the resolution of key 
risks. 
Using a mountain-climbing metaphor, competent public or private sponsors do not rush to climb 
the mountains that they are best equipped to climb. Rather, they seek to select, equip, and train a climbing 
party. In fact, the game consists in identifying projects that stretch capabilities but that, because of their 
complexity and risk, offer substantial value and benefits to clients that in spite of the costs involved. 
Processes. Governance processes set up decision-making frameworks to make sure all the right 
questions are being asked, to initiate research activities to develop answers, and to outline the hurdles that 
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the project must clear. Large multinational firms have often put in place complex frameworks composed 
of five or six decision gates in which most issues are addressed. Governmental frameworks are usually 
less complex with a few decision moments.  
For example the system instituted by the Royal Ministry of Finance of Norway includes three 
gates at which the project concept is tested. Project concepts are developed technically by the relevant 
ministries but must answer the following questions: What is the value for clients and opponents? Is value 
created properly shared? What are markets estimates? How will the project be financed? Could it be built 
using other alternatives? What are the major risks and how will they be dealt with? Where are the 
forgotten costs, especially in risk mitigation? How do estimates compare with other projects in the world? 
Have competing options such as Public Private Partnerships been analysed? The initial concept is assessed 
internally. However, holistic proposals are evaluated in cooperation with external expert evaluators 
(Samset at all, 2006).  
Methods for accumulating knowledge. Without comparative knowledge about costs, contracts, 
risks, and so on, it is very difficult to shape projects. Sponsors that get involved sporadically in large 
projects find themselves starting anew and building on high levels of ignorance.  The accumulation of 
knowledge has to be organized on a systematic and continuous basis. Sponsors should internally and in 
cooperation with others build knowledge bases on construction cost estimates, risk-bearing costs, 
contractual forms, practices for introducing innovation, financial methods for business modelling, and 
learned best practices. 
Powerful sponsors such as governments and large firms may even shape the environments in 
which projects will be developed. They may decide that ultimate users, engineering contractors or project 
management firms must build-up their capabilities to create value and share knowledge. Improved 
capabilities will make it possible to better answer questions and work co-operatively to develop superior 
solutions by engaging in generative thinking and search for innovative solutions. 
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Conclusion: Creation and Exercise of Options 
The succession of shaping episodes that form the front-end process to cope with risks can be reinterpreted 
in terms of the real-options framework that is currently revolutionizing academic treatments of project 
evaluation. In fact, as is often the case with cutting-edge practice, managers have been successful at 
creating value through the development and exercise of sequential options without explicitly framing the 
process in options terms. Academics have simply codified this practice in the form of a new conceptual 
framework. 
The real-options framework is based on the same logic as that of financial options as developed by 
Black and Scholes (1974). It recognizes that the decisions that determine project cash flows are made 
sequentially over many episodes. The key insight of this approach is that uncertainty or volatility may 
actually increase the value of a project, as long as flexibility is preserved and resources are not irreversibly 
committed. As a result, the economic value of a project when it is still relatively unformed is often greater 
than the discounted present value of the expected future cash flows. Value is increased through the 
creation of options for subsequent sequential choices and exercising these options in a timely fashion. 
Thus, sponsors seek projects that have the potential for large payoffs under particular institutional and 
technical circumstances. Our study illustrates the rich varieties of mechanisms through which these 
options are shaped and exercised over the life of the project – the real management that is integral to real 
options. 
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Table 1: Devices used in building strategic systems 
Information search Research and studies 
Expert judgments 
Debates, scenarios, risk seminars 
Multidisciplinary strategy teams 
Network building and co-optation Early involvement of financiers, operators, and others 
Public–private partnerships 
Alliance of owners sharing equity 
Partnerships with suppliers/contractors 
Coalitions with affected parties 
Structures of incentives, and contracts Risks/decision rights allocation 
Type and number of contracts 
Incentives/penalties 
Frame agreements 
Methods of contractor selection 
Project/design configuration Select geographical location/site 
Complementary investments and linkages 
Contract flexibility, ability to restructure 
Flexible/modular technical solutions 
Flexible contracts/contractual options 
Influence and bold actions Educate regulator, rating agencies, and others 
Side payments: compensation, add-ons 
Pre-emptive action, signals 
Climate of optimism 
Windows of opportunity 
Signal probity (e.g., bidding) 
Seek and improve on legal requirements 
Change laws and regulations 
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Figure 1. A taxonomy of LEPs in the IMEC sample. 
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Figure 2. Major risks in LEPs, IMEC study 
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Figure 3. The evolution of risks over a project’s life  
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Figure 4. Strategies to cope with risk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
High                                                           L ow
Extent of Control over Risks
T
y
p
e
s
 o
f 
R
is
k
s
S
p
e
c
if
ic
 t
o
 P
ro
je
c
t 
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
B
ro
a
d
, 
s
y
s
te
m
ic
3- Instill 
governability
1 – Assess
Mitigate
6- Embrace
5 – Hedge, 
diversify
4- Shape
Institutions, 
rules
2- Build
Robust
system
 34 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Comparative advantage in risk taking 
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Figure 7.   Stages in Project Shaping 
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Figure 8.A project as a series of shaping episodes 
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